The years following the Persian wars were dominated
by the growth of Athenian power. The foundation had been laid by Themistocles
who early on perceived the importance of a strong navy. The withdrawal of
the Spartans from the continuing war against the Persians further played
into the hands of the Athenians who now assumed the role of protagonist
of Hellenic freedom.
The Delean League
To establish closer ties with the Ionians
and the islands the Athenians established the League on the island
of Delos, the ancient centre of Ioanian worship, in 478-77 B.C. and it was henceforth called
the Confederacy of Delos. The object of the Delian League was to protect
the outlying rescued areas from renewed Persian attacks. But although it was formed as a maritime organization with an anti-Persian orientation, the alliance
very soon became an instrument for realizing Athenian ambitions in «Hellas»
proper. Still, dealing with the intiatial purposes for the formation of
the League they also wished as Zimmern tells us:
«to push the war into the enemy's
country, to revenge and indemnify themselves by plundering for the losses
they had sustained and to complete the liberation of their enslaved brothers.
They were ready and eager to be led to the attack. (Zimmern, 1947, p. 186).»
The alliance then represented a duality in
character, since it was established not only for freedom but also for defence.
Furthermore, apart from the primary objectives other factors, probably of a
more practical nature, contributed to the creation of the Delian
League.
According to Plutarch, it was under pressure particularly from
Chians, Samians and Lesbians that Aristides on behalf of the Athenians
took over the leadership of the allies (Meiggs, 1979, p. 42).
Fear could be a possible excuse for the pressure
of the allies to institutionalize the Delian League. Fear and the threat of a probable reconquest by the «Barbarians» who still, not
only had not lost their military power but also had not abandoned totally
their «imperialistic» plans towards the West. The Greek, free, adventurous
spirit was afraid of becoming subjugated to Persian rule. Their
love of freedom made them realize from the very beginning that without
a common League they would very soon become a part of a Persian Satrapy.
But fear, according to Meiggs, could have motivated the Athenians to accept
the responsibilities not only of establishing the League but also of becoming
the leader of the alliance. The Athenians had very soon understood *that
they would be the ultimate target of the Persians in the event of a new attack.
One could say that since Themistocles had made Athens a sea-power the Persians
would be challenged by the superiority of the Athenians at sea. The Athenians,
however, in order to protect their city fortified Athens in 478 B.C., and
in order to protect their sea power estabished the Delian
League.
For some historians it was also pride and
generosity after the glorious victories over the Persians that led the
Athenians to institutionalize the unification of the Ionian world. (Meiggs
1979:43, Fleiss 1966: 5)].
Meiggs in "The Athenian Empire" adds another factor that played a decisive
role in the establishment of the League. This is the role of the «Individuals».
It is very probable, as Plutarch tells us, that these people didn't work
for their own personal success. There is no clear indication that they were
motivated by their own interest; instead, they acted according to the needs of Athens.
The glory of their state was placed above all else. Aristides was probably
one of those Athenians who was motivated by «patriotism». Aristides was
the personality of the time, the man who had organized the Delian League.
However, Aristides' real motives became debatable concerning as did the pretexts that he used for the establishment of the alliance. For
some, he was a shrewd man who had perceived the idea of uniting the Athenians
and the Ionians in order to benefit the Athenians economically, and politically.
For others, such as his contemporary Athenian Callaeschrus, he was nothing
but a cunning person. «A fox by name and fox by nature». C Meiggs
1979:40).
One could say that these characterizations are
probably cynical since Aristides is well known in Greek historical tradition
as (a) (Meiggs 1979:44) a man of justice who was generous
to friends and enemies. Furthermore, Aristides was an Athenian who «loved»
his state and as a consequence he would do the best for Athens. Taking
also into account, that the rise of Athens had been perhaps delayed not only
because of internal political strife but also because of the lack of resources,
Aristides clearly expressed the Athenian motives. I would dare say then
that Athenenian policies were not motivated by altruism or dreams of heroic
grandeur alone, but also by considerations of a pragmatic nature. At this
point, I would like to refer to an additional reason that could probably
justify the «foreign policy» of Athens concerning the confederacy of Delos.
It was perhaps «ARCHE» the Greek «ÁÑ×Ç»
political domination over the others that motivated the Athenians. Could it
be true that the Athenians needed an overglorified position of ruling,
an «ÁÑ×Ç» over all in order to justify their own freedom?
It is possible, then, that the Delian League was the means to express their
political domination and their role of protector.
Concluding the reasons that led to the establishment of the League,
it would be valuable to stress the attitude of Sparta towards the fears
of the majority of the Greek world and their need for such an alliance.
1. ÁÑ×Ç: Harmony, Power Politics, Athenian domination
According to Barry, it was Sparta's inability
and unwillingness, exhibited in her failure to follow up the battle
of Mycale (479 B.C.) that forced upon Athens the leadership
of a large segment of the Greek world (Burry 1963:328).
Perhaps it was the naval supremacy of Athens
that deterred the Spartans from joining the alliance or the fact that Sparta's
political system and military orientation did not allow for a «flexible» foreign
policy.
As a consequence, Sparta remained outside the Delian alliance, but Athenian
supremacy over the League of the Ionians did challenge Sparta to take up the search for
her own «spheres» of influence.
By the spring of 478 or 477 the Confederacy of
Delos was ready. Aristides the «assessor» first drew up a list of members
who numbered about 140 and were entitled to be ranked as a charter-members.
The Delian League included the Ionian and Aelian cities of Asia;
the islands adjacent to coast from Lesbos to Rhodes; 35 cities from the Hellespont;
35 from Thrace, most of the Cyclades; Euboea except the city of Carystus;
and 24 from the region of Caria. (Mc gregor 1987:101).
The allies had to confirm their loyalty to the
League by a common oath. The members swore to have the same friends
and enemies:
«I will not desert the plethos, (common people)
of Athens nor the allies of the Athenians» (Meiggs
1979:45).
The permanence of the alliance was symbolized
by the dropping of iron weights into the sea:«The
alliance was to last until the weights rose up again».
Delos was chosen to be the centre of the League because of its religious
associations and its practical advantages. The Delian temple of Apollo
formed a convenient bank and the first contributions were paid there. Delos
was situated in the centre of the Aegean (1), it had a good harbour and like
Delphi it had always been too wealthy to have independent political ambitions (2).
(Meiggs 1979:43).
The capture of Sestos under the leadership
of Gimon, in 476 BC, was the first achievement of the League. This successful
expedition though, made the Athenians and the allies realize that campaigning
cost money and since the Delian Confederacy was an alliance of sea-states
they should find a basis for the economic structure of the League. The
basis of the contract was that each state should furnish ships (chirems)
to the common fleet. However, the problem that arose was that certain members
were small and poor; many could not equip more than one or two ships and
many could do no more than contribute a part of the expense of furnishing
a single galley (Burry 1963: 328).
1. Around Delos there were member-States of the
Alliance
2. To have the treasures in a safe place.
The big islands which had a naval tradition
to maintain would certainly contribute in ships while the smaller states
should pay yearly a sum of money to a common treasury.
How was this amount fixed? For Berry it's very probable that a calculation
was made that those States which undertook to pay in money ought to have
been able to contribute between them 100 ships and that the annual contribution
of 460 talents was taken as the equivalent of the contribution.
Burry and Plutarch agrees
that Aristides was asked to examine the land and revenues
of the cities in order to estimate their capacity and hence carefully determine
the contribution of each State (Burry 1963:328), (Meiggs 1979:53).
According to Thucydides,
the Athenians had determined a fixed amount of 460 talents which all the
cities were obliged to pay. Meiggs
accepts the source of Thucydides upon the fixed contribution
as more reliable while Plutarch is characterized by
him as a late and probably unreliable source. (Meiggs 1979:58).
Thus from the very beginning the Confederacy consisted
of two kinds of members: those who paid an equivalent in money, a "phoros" as
it was called, and those who furnished ships. (The first class was larger).
One could say, though, that this differentiation created a problem since
the majority of the allies, even those who were able to contribute ships,
preferred the system of money payments, which did not oblige their men
to leave home.
The tribute was received by ten Athenian officers who bore the title
of Hellenotamiae or "Treasurers of the Greeks"
(Fine 1983:363).
The economic character of the Delean League followed this type of arrangment
till 525 BC when Aristidis was replaced as the financier of the Alliance
by Cleon.
Furthermore, the council of the confederates met at Delos, where the
treasury was located, and each member had an equal vote, in order that the stronger
members would have no formal advantage in the council. (Fine
1983:364). According to Thucydides the allies were at first autonomous
but at the same time were not in a suspicious mood. This reaction of the
allies could probably explain the acceptance of Athenian "hegemony"
from the early period of the formation of the League. Athens, hence, could
influence the smaller states and the number of these votes overcame the
weight of any opposition which the larger states could offer.
As leader of the Confederacy, Athens had the
executive entirely in her hands and it was of the greatest significance
that the treasurers were not selected by the whole body of Confederates
but by the Athenian citizens. The Delian League then having settled the
political and economic structure started taking actions under the leadership
of Athens. In 476, Eion was captured from the Persians by Cimon.
From that time on Cimon initiated a number of expeditions in the Aegean.
Scyros, Carystus and Naxos which had been notorious pirate bases now became
Athenian settlements (Cleruchies). Simon also as leader of the Delian
Alliance sailed to the Eurymedon in Asia Minor in 467 where he won decisive
victories at sea and on land. The Eurymedon marked the culmination of Athenian
leadership against Persia, it eliminated any serious threat to the Aegean
and opened the way for a profitable offensive in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The actions of the League were escalated by
the Athenian expedition to Egypt in 459 B.C. with 200 or 300 ships. Unfortunately,
this expediton proved to be disastrous for the alliance in terms of lost
soldiers and ships (Burn 1962: 127).
With the passing of time many expeditions were undertaken by the Delian
League. Some were quite successful in terms of political and economic gains
while others proved to be disastrous. However, the Alliance seemed to
be bothered by a probably crucial difficulty. Since the primary purpose of
the League was, as Thucydides tells us, to ravage the King's territory
in vengeance for the damage he had inflicted (Meiggs 1979:44); how could
the defensive character of the alliance be justified?
According to Fleiss, the determined pursuit of
the Persians had two effects: on the one hand it raised Athenian prestige
throughout the Ionian world and brought more cities into the alliance, while,
on the other hand, it encouraged defections from the League. (Fleiss
1966:5). The Delian Alliance then becomes transformed from a defensive military
organisation, as for example, the Hellenic League was (481 BC), to a commercial
Alliance.
Athens stood not only for freedom from the Barbarians
(the Persians) but also for freedom of intercourse and freedom of trade.
Athens, despite the fact that it established what Thycydides called "A
hegemony over autonomous allies who participated in common synods"
(Kagan 1969:40) had probably based her "hegemony",
her power politics, upon mutual dependence.
This is a quite possible since both were interdependent
for reasons of survival. Athens needed the resources of the allies and
the allies were dependent upon the Athenians because they provided them with
a secure life. Athens as a sea power would "police" the Aegean
with her triremes and, taking advantage of the allies, played the role
of the protector and consequently "imposed" her "power
politics", her political and judicial dominion.
Although some of the allies, such as Naxos, Melos and Mytelene, protested against this association, viewing their obligations
of membership as excessively burdensome, the administration of justice was preferable.
Taking into consideration these advantages the allies continued to
participate in the League despite their occasional conflicts with Athens.
In the years following 460 BC the Athenians were extremely active.
Most events that took place during that era show that the Athenians abandoned
the policy advocated by Gimon and began hostilities with various allies
of Sparta and soon with Sparta itself.
In fact, the fighting in Greece from 459 until 445 (the date of the Thirty
Years' Peace between Athens and Sparta), with an intervening five years'
truce, can be called the First Peloponnesian War to contrast it with the
Great Peloponnesian War which broke out in 431. Thucydides implies that
Athens began hostilities by naval attacks on allies of Sparta such as Corinth
and Aegina which by the spring of 457 was forced to surrender and come into
the «Athenian» League as a tribute-paying member. What is noteworthy about
these struggles is that it was the first recorded time that Athenian allies --presumably
members of the Delian League-- took up arms against a Greek in a quarrel
which existed solely between that State and Athens.
However, the conflicts were multiplied since the Corinthians and their
allies, wishing to aid Aegina, invaded Megara in the belief that the Athenians,
with large forces occupied in Aegina and Egypt, would have to raise the
siege of Aegina in order to bring support to their recent ally, Megara.
The above events could convince us that the promising character of
the Delian «Confederacy» had been changed. The common oath had been replaced
by struggles revolts and civil wars under Athenian hegemony.
. In 454 BC the treasury
of the League was transferred from Delos to Athens
(1).
According to Davies the catastrophe of the Egyptian expedition in
454 BC, and the revolts of the allies motivated the Athenians to transfer
the treasury to Athens.
Whether fear was the true reason or merely
a pretext we are not able to know. It seems very probable, though, that the Athenians in a very short timemanaged to turn the event to their own advantage.
From that year (454) they began to collect
one sixteenth of the tribute paid by the allies as the first obligation
to Athena Polias, Patron of Athens and now Patron of the reorganized League.
A careful record was made each year of the
aparche paid to Athena, the amount was audited by the Iogistae for the
Helenotamial and the annual lists were inscribed on a large stone pillar
displayed on the Acropolis. After the removal of the treasury from Delos to
Athens the character of the Delian League changeds without pretext. Inititated
as a defensive alliance, it turned into a merely maritime Confederacy and changed
the Athenian «Empire».
The money collected would soon provide temples on the Acropolis, support
the Athenian fleet, provide work for the citizens of Athens and accumulate
a reserve fund. In 453 Pericles initiated an expedition to
the Corinthian Gulf. In the same year the area of Achaea was brought under Athenian power and in 450, Cimon sailed to Cyprus where he won a crushing
victory.
By 450, the Delian League appeared to have been trasnsformed
from a collection of autonomous Aegean States, united in a defensive purpose,
under the hegemony of Athens with its central treasury at Delos into an
organization of Athenian colonies, still nominally autonomous, but whose
centre and treasury was now in Athens.
It appears that Athens had just become conscious
of her «new» power and as a consequence, unfolded a vitality that would
not let her remain inactive in the face of the opportunities presented.
But whatever the tendencies of Athens were, which are probably attributable
to emotional and pragmatic causes, it is clear that the allies were considered
to be of crucial impotance. What justified the tolerance of the allies
towards Athenian «power politics» and the pressure on behalf of the
Athenians for controlling the Aegean and the Ionians is perhaps their interdependence
for survival. The allies needed Athenian protection and Athens needed their resources
and their ports.
However noting the emotional reasons, perhaps
the most striking expression of the compulsive basis of Athenian «hegemonic»
policy is the statement of the Athenian envoy Euphemus at Camarina in Sicily,
during the great Sicilian campaign: «We are rulers in order not to be subjects
«(Fleiss 1966: 108).
Concluding I would say that, the Delian
League -- which was established and developed during the years between the
Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War could be characterized as a promising
alliance with a defensive character that was steadily «converted» into a collection
of allies under the «ARCHE» of Athens. It seems that all powers
benefitted from this alliance since all powers were probably seeking ways
to justify their tendencies.
(1) Although several sources
(for example Plutarch, Perikles, Aristides) refer to this significant event,
it is according to Fine, epigraphic evidence which provides the date. A
series of very important inscriptions known as the tribute-quota lists,
many fragments of which have been found especially on the Athenian Acropolis,
furnish valuable information on various aspects, particularly the financial,
of the Delian League. (back)
works cited
