AHI recognizes that the
ultimate decision on the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annans
proposal for settlement of the Cyprus problem rests with the people
of Cyprus and their elected representatives and the people of Greece
and their elected representatives. AHIs responsibility is
to analyze the proposal from an American point of view of what is
in the best interests of the U.S.
The agreement recently proposed by Secretary-General
Annan for the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem is
an even more complicated version of the 1959-1960 London-Zurich
agreements imposed on the Greek Cypriots during the Cold War. As
currently written, the proposal is undemocratic and unworkable.
It also violates key United Nations (U.N.) resolutions and the European
Unions (EU) democratic norms and acquis communautaire. The
U.S. should be the champion of democratic norms throughout the world,
not sham constitutions like the one proposed. Especially now, when
our war on international terrorism makes it tempting to subordinate
timeless principles to immediate needs, we should be wary of the
new Cyprus proposal which elevates expediency over the rule of law.
For reasons noted below, the new proposal does not deserve the U.S.s
backing as the basis for settlement of the Cyprus problem.
1. The proposal is undemocratic
The parliamentary system essentially creates a minority veto.
The proposal creates a bicameral legislature referred to as Parliament
which consists of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Senate
shall be composed of 48 members with 24 members from each component
state. The Chamber of Deputies shall also be composed of 48 members
elected on a proportional basis. However, each component state is
guaranteed to have a minimum of one-fourth of the seats of the Chamber
of Deputies. (Constitution Art. 20)
Laws are enacted by majority vote of each house
of Parliament as long as at least one-fourth of the senators from
each component state comprises the majority vote in the Senate,
thus creating a veto power for the 18% Turkish Cypriot minority.
The following key matters require a vote of 2/5 of the senators
from each component state (Constitution Art. 23):
A. Ratification of international agreements on
matters within the competence
of the component states,
B. Ratification of treaties, adoption of laws concerning airspace,
continental
shelf and territorial waters of Cyprus,
C. Adoption of laws concerning citizenship, immigration, and taxation,
D. Approval of the budget of the common state,
E. Election of the Presidential Council.
Regardless of the composition of the Parliament,
each component state in effect has 1 vote on fundamental laws. No
fundamental laws can be enacted unless both of the component states
consent to any such law. This means that although the Turkish Cypriot
component state will compromise 18% of the population of Cyprus,
it will have a weighed vote equal to the vote of the Greek Cypriot
component state which will compromise 80% of the population. This
arrangement is clearly undemocratic and a recipe for stalemate.
The minority veto that is embodied in the Parliamentary voting procedure
is also present in the Presidential Council which exercises the
executive power of the component state, Constitution, Art. 24. The
Presidential Council is composed of 6 members who are elected by
the Parliament with the super majority vote of the Senate. The Presidential
Council shall effectively make decisions by a majority vote, however,
each such a majority must compromise at least one Council member
from each component state. Again, political paralysis in the exercise
of executive power is the likely result of this arrangement.
The proposal strengthens the minority vetoes of the ill-advised
1959-1960 agreements, which vetoes led to the breakdown of the Cyprus
constitution. The minority veto is undemocratic and therefore repugnant
to core U.S. values. Institutionalizing the minority veto in Cyprus
will open the door for similar demands in other places where one
ethnic group is outnumbered by another, e.g. Kurds in Turkey, Arabs
in Israel, Hungarians in Romania, Turks in Bulgaria, Albanians in
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbs in Kosovo, Greeks
in Albania, and minorities in Africa, Asia, and North and South
America. It will also put the U.S. in the unseemly position of justifying
its support of a minority veto in some places while reviling it
in others. Rather than supporting undemocratic norms, the U.S. should
promote with consistency and vigor the democratic policy espoused
for Cyprus by Vice President George H.W. Bush on July 6, 1988:
"We seek for Cyprus a constitutional democracy
based on majority
rule, the rule of law, and the protection of minority rights."
2. The proposal is
unworkable
It is useful to recall that the State Departments Bureau of
Intelligence and Research issued an analysis of the 1959 London-Zurich
agreements, calling them dysfunctional. It predicted problem areas
that were manifested in 1963. (See Buraeu of Intelligence and Research
Publication no. 8047 "Analysis of Cyprus Agreements,"
July 1959.) The minority veto, which the new proposal would institutionalize,
was a key reason for the failure of the complicated 1959-1960 agreement.
The new proposal is even more complicated than the 1959-1960 agreements
and creates the conditions for continuous squabbling, disagreements
and deadlock. It is micromanagement at its worst.
3. The proposal violates key U.N. resolutions
The proposal violates on its face important U.N. resolutions
which guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Cyprus. Among these are:
U.N. Security Council resolution 186, March 4, 1964;
U.N. General Assembly resolution 3212 of November
12, 1974, adopted by the U.N. Security Council resolution 365 of
December 13, 1974;
U.N. Security Council resolution 367, March 12, 1975; and
U.N. Security Council resolution 541, November 18, 1983.
4. The proposal undermines
the Foundation Agreement
The Supreme Court shall consist of an unspecified number
of judges with an equal number of judges from each component state
appointed by the Presidential Council, (Constitution, Art. 34).
This provision contradicts the Foundation Agreement which states
that the Supreme Court shall consist of 9 judges, 3 from each component
state and 3 non-Cypriot judges, (Foundation, Art. 6). The Court
is empowered inter alia to interpret the documents compromising
the proposal and to resolve deadlocks in the institutions created
by the proposal. Decisions are made by a simple majority. The Court
is an unelected oligarchy that will in effect have the power to
legislate under the guise of interpreting the documents of the proposal
and resolving institutional deadlocks. Ultimately, assuming the
structure of the Court as set forth in the Foundation Agreement,
it is likely that 3 non-Cypriots will make the fundamental legislative
decisions for the common state abrogating its sovereignty and independence.
5. The proposal subverts
property rights
One of the most pernicious effects of the illegal Turkish
occupation of northern Cyprus is that rightful owners of real property
that is located in northern Cyprus have been and continue to be
excluded from their real property by the Turkish military. The Plan
proposes a highly complicated, ambiguous and uncertain regime for
resolving property issues. However, the proposals are clearly based
on the principle that real property owners can ultimately be forced
to give up their property rights and abide by whatever regime us
created by the Plan for property issues.
In June 1999, officials of the Republic of Cyprus commissioned a
legal opinion entitled "Legal Issues Arising from Certain Population
Transfers and Displacements on the Territory of the Republic of
Cyprus in the Period since 20 July 1974." That opinion was
prepared by 10 experts in international law. The basic conclusions
of that legal opinion are as follows:
A. Forced population transfers effected on a discriminatory
basis are unlawful under international law whether such transfers
occur between or within a state and whether they occur during peacetime
or war,
B. It is unlawful to seek to maintain a situation arising from forced
population transfers by legal or other measures that prohibit the
return of the displaced population,
C. Compulsory exchanges of property belonging to affected persons
are unlawful if the purpose of the exchanges is to legitimize a
situation arising from force population transfer,
D. Any compulsory exchange scheme even if contained in a treaty
would have to be independently scrutinized under the European Convention
on Human Rights and, by implication, would be illegal despite being
in a treaty if the scheme was found to violate the right of persons
to use and enjoy their rightful property, (see Article 1, Protocol
I Article 14 of the Convention).
To the extent that the transfer of property regime
set forth in the proposal provides for any forcible exchange of
property, that regime violates both the Convention and international
law. Any attempt by the common state or the component states to
implement any such regime would render them liable to the affected
property owners.
6. Supporting the proposal requires the U.S.
to follow a double standard
The proposal by its silence expressly disregards the reason for
the current Cyprus situation: the Turkish army invaded the island
on July 20, 1974 and renewed its use of force on August 14-16, 1974,
three weeks after the legitimate government of Cyprus had been restored
on July 23, 1974. The invasion violated not only the U.N. Charter
(Art. 2 (4)), but also U.S. laws the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (as amended), the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Act, and the
NATO Treaty. The invasion displaced 180,000 Greek Cypriots and was
accompanied by murder, rape, and theft of property by the Turkish
army (see European Commission on Human Rights report of July 10,
1976, not officially published until January 1979 after consideration
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe).
The new proposal silently ignores these historical facts and imposes
no obligation on Turkey, either directly or through its puppet regime
in northern Cyprus, to rectify the losses of life and property or
to account for violations of laws and treaties. In the face of the
proposals silence regarding Turkeys role in creating
the current state of affairs, the U.S. must apply a double standard
to support the proposal. The proposal also requires the U.S. to
turn its back on brave Turkish citizens struggling for human rights
and real democratic reforms. Support of the proposal is inconsistent
with President George H.W. Bushs September 9, 1990 condemnation
of aggression made in the context of Iraqs invasion of Kuwait:
"We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that
aggression cannot and
will not pay."* * * *
"No peaceful international order is possible if larger states
can devour their smaller neighbors."Likewise, the U.S. must
not ignore the wisdom of the Eisenhower Doctrine, articulated by
President Eisenhower on October 31, 1956, during the Middle East
crisis:
"There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law
if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those
who oppose us and another for our friends."
7. The proposal fails to
demilitarize Cyprus
Because the proposal allows for a significant number of Turkish
troops to remain on the island under expanded intervention rights,
supporting the proposal requires the U.S. to ignore the U.N.s
requirement for a full and true demilitarization of Cyprus (see
unanimous U.N. General Assembly resolution 3212 of November 1, 1974,
adopted by the U.N. Security Council resolution 365 of December
13, 1974). The anachronistic 1959 Treaty of Guarantee has no place
in the post-Cold War era and new millennium.
By ignoring the above considerations the U.S.
will passively tolerate for Turkey a standard of conduct the U.S.
aggressively condemns elsewhere. The perceived need for Turkeys
cooperation in the war against international terrorism does not
justify such a double standard. Rather than abandoning the bedrock
American principles of democracy and the rule of law, the U.S. should
withhold its support for the new Cyprus proposal.
The American Hellenic Institute (AHI) was founded
in 1974 following Turkeys illegal invasion and occupation
of 37.3% of Cyprus. AHI is a membership organization with members
throughout the nation. AHIs core mission is to promote American
values and the rule of law in U.S. foreign policy and to strengthen
relations between the U.S. and Greece and Cyprus as being in the
best interests of the United States.
This memorandum follows a meeting and discussion of the U.N. Secretary-Generals
proposal by the AHI advisory committee which is composed of the
following members: Kostas Alexakis, Nick Chimicles, Van Coufoudakis,
Nick Karambelas, James Lagos, James Marketos, and Ted Spyropoulos.
Executive Director Nick Larigakis, Serge Hadji-Mihaloglou and Gene
Rossides also participated.
For additional information, please contact Chrysoula Economopoulos
at 202-785-8430 or at chrysoula@ahiworld.org. For general information
on AHI, please view our website at http://www.ahiworld.org.
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